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ABSTRACT. This article deals with ordoliberalism, a school of economics and legal
theory that emerged in the 1930s and whose ideas became particularly influential
in the shaping of  the post-WWII German economic model.  Instead of  a purely
political  or  economic  doctrine,  the  article  approaches  ordoliberalism  as  a
philosophical theory that originated as a response to the crisis of economics and
scientific reason in general, to the growing dispersion of individual sciences and
the loss of their common foundation. By focusing on the relation between Edmund
Husserl and Walter Eucken, the founder of ordoliberalism, the article highlights
some  of  the  methodological  and  conceptual  innovations  that  constituted  the
unique approach of ordoliberalism, namely, its aim to construct economics as a
rule-oriented  science  with  a  strong  emphasis  on  constitutional  choice  and
institutional issues. According to the main argument, the ordoliberal emphasis on
law  and  executive  institutions  was  a  consistent  outcome  of  their  theoretical
decision to construct economics as a normative science of ideal forms.
In the concluding notes to his  General Theory (1936) John Maynard Keynes
pointed out that despite the pragmatic outlook of modern politics, economists
and  political  philosophers  are  in  fact  more  influential  than  is  commonly
understood.  «Practical men who believe themselves to be quite exempt from
any  intel-lectual  influence», Keynes  wrote,  «are  usually  the  slaves  of  some
defunct  economist.  Madmen  in  authority,  who  hear  voices  in  the  air,  are
distilling  their  frenzy  from some academic  scribbler  of  a  few years  back.»1
What Keynes had in mind was not only Marx and the October Revolution, but
all more importantly, the influence of classical economists such as Adam Smith,
David Ricardo and Jean-Baptiste Say to the political imaginary of European
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nations. While it was undeniable that these theorists of free-market capitalism
had contributed to the overall democratization of Western nations, they had
undermined the consequences of the liberal doctrine in separating the sphere
of  economic activity from politics.  With its  trust  in the autonomy and self-
balancing character of markets, the classical theory failed to appreciate the role
of state and public institutions in balancing the instabilities of the market. This
was  true  as  much  in  regard  to  the  weak  political  responses  to  the  Great
Depression in the early 1930s as it was with the totalitarian regimes of Europe
that grew out of the fundamental disappointment in the inaptitude of liberal
politics. Thus, while problems of direct domination and excessive use of power
still persist, they are often surpassed by ideologies and narratives that limit our
choices and prevent us from taking action.
The ongoing crisis of European economies has prompted new interest in the
theoretical, ideological, and  historical foundations of the European economic
model.2 This  is  particularly  true  in  the  case  of  the  core  countries  of  the
Economic  and  Monetary  Union  (EMU),  the  “euro  zone”,  with  its  deep
structural  problems  such  as  uneven  trade  surpluses,  different  levels  of
production  and  the  fragility  of  the  financial  sector.  The  analysis  of  these
problems,  respectively,  often  rests  on  diverging  economic  and  political
premises. According to some, the countries of Southern and Northern Europe
were too different to form a common currency area; according to others, these
differences indicate the necessity of a genuinely political union that could even
out the imbalances of the euro zone.3 While the “euro crisis” itself has been
constructed primarily as an economic problem, it has had wide repercussions
to our ideas of democracy, state sovereignty, and social rights.4
In  the  research  literature,  questions  concerning  the  European  economic
model are often discussed under the title of “economic constitution”.5 Here, the
concept of constitution refers not only to a basic legal framework but the overall
ideological and institutional solutions that have shaped the post-war European
economies on both national and European-wide level. In the case of the EMU,
the concept answers the basic question as in what ways should economy be
2 See e.g. TUORI & TUORI 2014, YOUNG 2014.
3 Regarding the first line of interpretation, see e.g. SINN 2014. HABERMAS 2013 pays particular attention
to  the  growing  role  of  “executive  federalism”  within  the  EU,  and  emphasizes  the  need  of  a
genuinely political union.
4 On the development of the European idea of welfare state in the past decade,  see in particular
HEMERIJCK 2013.
5 See  STREIT & MUSSLER 1994. A recent contribution by  TUORI & TUORI (2014: 231ff.)  spells out two
different aspects of “economic constitution” of the EU: (i) the “microeconomic constitution” that
consists of free market principles and competition law; (ii) the “macroeconomic constitution” that
limits the budget autonomy of individual states.
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regulated on the European level, and to what extent should individual states
give away their economic and political sovereignty. The main traditions of this
idea are usually divided in two.6
(i) The  French  tradition,  often  referred  to  as  gouvernance  économique
(“economic governance”) or dirigisme, is most often defined in terms
of active macroeconomic coordination. Historically,  this tradition has
been  linked  to  a  set  of  policies  such  as  indicative  planning,
protectionism, and demands for  stronger regulation. Alongside with
Keynesian  ideas,  the  concept  has  also  been  linked  to  an  overall
democratization of economic policy.
(ii) The German component, sometimes referred to as Ordnungspolitik (i.e.,
politics  of  order),  is  perhaps  best  known  from  the  tradition  of
ordoliberalism. Historically, this tradition has accentuated the role of
common rules and a strong legal framework as the basic mechanisms
of  macroeconomic  coordination.  Ordoliberals  have  been  in  favor  of
strong executive institutions such as politically neutral central bank that
ought to  guarantee the stability of price  mechanism; moreover,  they
have been in favor of strict competition laws that seek to regulate the
markets  by  dismantling  monopolies,  and  preventing  the  abuse  of
controlling market positions. In the case of the EMU, the ordoliberals
have accentuated the role of budget rules (e.g., the Maastricht criteria
limiting  sovereign  debt  and  budget  deficits)  as  well  as  a  politically
neutral European Central Bank (structurally modeled on the basis of
German Bundesbank).
Although the current crisis is far from being over, it can be well argued that
majority of the actual responses to the current euro crisis have been in favor of
the ordoliberal tradition.7 Institutions such as the European Commission and
the European Central Bank have gained new competences and responsibilities,
the so-called fiscal compact has strengthened the control and implementation
of budget rules, and there has been little effort for the promotion of EU wide
investment policies. Not only has Germany turned out to be the strongest of
European economies by output, but it seems to have won the ideological battle
on the basic narrative on what went wrong with the crisis and how to fix it.
Common rules were broken – thus, the legal framework must be strengthened.8
6 See e.g. STREIT & MUSSLER 1994; LABROUSSE & WEISZ 2001.
7 On a critical reading of ordoliberalism in the management of the euro crisis, see e.g. YOUNG 2014.
8 An illuminative example of this is the  Bundesbank president Jens Weidmann’s speech “Of dentists
and economists – the importance of a consistent economic policy framework” before the Juristische
Studiengesellschaft,  Karlsruhe,  11  February  2014.  The  speech  is  available  at
http://www.bis.org/review/r140217c.pdf.
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German  ordoliberalism,  however,  is  not  a  single  and  unified  historical
tradition.  Its  roots  can nevertheless be traced back to the so-called Freiburg
School of National Economics, in particular, to the work of economists Walter
Eucken (1891–1950), Adolf Lampe (1897–1948), and Friedrich Lutz (1901–1975).
Together with jurists such as Franz Böhm (1895–1977) and  Hans Großmann-
Doerth (1894–1944) the economists made up the so-called Freiburg Circles that
served as an important platform for different resistance movements during the
National Socialist era.9 The ordoliberals, in particular, played a central role in
the  transition  from  the  planned  war-time  economy  to  the  “social  market
economy”  of  the  post-war  period  and  the  creation  of  the  so-called
Wirtschaftswunder, the German economic miracle.10 Ludwig Erhard (1897–1977),
who served as a Minister of Economics under Chancellor Adenauer from 1949
onwards – and became the chief economic architect of the Federal Republic –
was a  strong proponent  of  ordoliberal  policies,  contributing strongly to  the
post-war currency reforms and the creation of a politically neutral Bundesbank
in 1957. 
Although the concept of neoliberalism was attached also to ordoliberals in
the 1950s and 1960s, their views on the role of state and social policies differed
rather substantially from the more laissez-faire oriented versions of Austrian or
(later)  Chicago-based  neoliberalism.11 Free  market  economy,  according  to
ordoliberals,  could  only  function  within  a  competitive  environment  that  is
sustained by a strong and effective legal framework – what both Eucken and
Böhm  called  an  “economic  constitution”  (Wirtschaftsverfassung).12 The
ordoliberals  criticized  both  Fascism and Socialism  for  their  trust  in  central
planning,  and  argued  against  Keynesianism  that  all  decisions  concerning
employment  and  the  rate  of  investment  should  be  left  to  the  market
participants  themselves.  The  conscious  shaping  of  political  institutions  and
legal culture, rather than mere trust in the invisible hand of the market place,
was to be made the basic principle of liberal governance.
As Foucault and others have emphasized, Eucken’s original insights on the
role and idea of economics as science were significantly influenced by another
9 On the programmatic declaration of ordoliberalism, see introduction in Böhm 1937. The concept
“ordoliberalism” is a later invention, and it refers to the journal ORDO established by Eucken and
Böhm in 1948. See PTAK 2009, VANBERG 2001a, 2001b.
10 SALLY 1996.
11 For a good analysis of the differences between ordoliberalism and the Austrian School, see  PTAK
2009. Erhard, however, participated in the meetings of The Mont Pélerin Society, the main forum of
(mainly) Austrian and US neoliberalism. On the relation between MPS and Freiburg School, see
VANBERG 2001b, 17 ff.
12 EUCKEN 1989, 52ff., BÖHM 1937, xix.
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Freiburgian  movement,  Edmund  Husserl’s  phenomenological  philosophy.13
This  influence  was  both  professional  as  well  as  personal,  as  Eucken,  who
arrived at Freiburg in 1927, developed a lasting relationship with Husserl that
ended only in latter’s death in 1938. Husserl became the godfather of Eucken’s
daughter Irene, and the Eucken family was one of the few to attend the funeral
of  the  otherwise  academically  isolated Husserl.  As Foucault  suggests,  what
Eucken  acquired  from  phenomenology  was  a  new  idea  of  economics  as  a
rigorous science, which was to avoid the historical relativism of the Historical
School of Economics, represented by thinkers such as Wilhelm Roscher (1817–
1894) and particularly Gustav von Schmoller (1838–1917), as well as the empty
apriorism  of  the  Austrian  School  represented  by  Carl  Menger  (1840–1921),
Eugen  von  Böhm-Bawerk  (1851–1914)  and  Ludwig  von  Mises  (1881–1973).
Economics, in Eucken’s view, was to go beyond mere historical typification of
economic systems, but it was also to overcome the level of pure calculation of
the interests of individual economic agents. As a form of science, economics
was to commit itself to the search of universally valid truths and laws, but it
was to attach its analysis to the concrete development of existing economies.
Abstraction and ideation, rather than speculation and construction, were to be
made the central principles of economic analysis. Law and history, rather than
pure moral philosophy, were to assist economics in implementing its normative
tasks.
This  article  takes  a  closer  look  at  Eucken’s  idealistic  understanding  of
economics and its relation to Husserlian phenomenology. It argues that while
Eucken  based  his  approach  (“everyday  economics”)  on  phenomenological
premises, he nevertheless failed to appreciate the complexity of Husserl’s own
theory of ideality, especially its normative implications. In Eucken’s early work
The  Foundations  of  Economics (orig.  1939),  the  insistence  for  a  rigorous
systematic  analysis  of  different  types of  production translated into a  rather
limited account concerning primarily legal-institutional aspects, the so-called
“rules of the game”. Eucken’s main theoretical contribution, his theory of the
“ideal forms” of economy, relied fundamentally on the demand for exactness
as the  basic  criteria  for  scientific  universality.  This  entailed that  economics,
despite its debt to moral philosophy and history, relied essentially on a modern
understanding on the role of theory as a law-oriented analysis. As I would like
to  propose  as  a  working  hypothesis,  Eucken’s  interest  in  the  problem  of
constitutional choice and legal norms can be understood, at least in part, on the
13 See  especially  the “Lecture  Five”  of  the  biopolitics  lectures in  FOUCAULT 2008:  101–121.  A more
detailed  analysis  has  been  provided  by  KLUMP 2003  and  KLUMP &  WÖRSDÖRFER 2011.  For
methodological links, see HERRMANN-PILLATH 1994.
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basis of his understanding of ideality.
1. Walter Eucken and Everyday Economics
The  work  of  Walter  Eucken  and  the  whole  ordoliberal  movement  had  its
background in the late 19th and early 20th century disputes on the nature and
purpose of economic theory. Among Austrian and German economists,  this
debate  was  known  as  Methodenstreit,  a  “controversy  over  method”  (of
economics),  but  it  also  concerned  the  status  of  economics  as  a  theoretical-
scientific  discipline.  In  the  19th century,  economic  problems  were  analyzed
predominantly under the title of “political economy” that focused on questions
of production, consumption and trade – what Adam Smith famously defined
as An inquiry into the nature and causes of the wealth of nations. As an individual
discipline,  political  economy  was  originally  considered  as  a  part  of  moral
philosophy,  and  it  developed  in  parallel  with  the  social  and  political
philosophy of 18th and 19th centuries. Many of its most important proponents
such  as  Adam  Smith,  John  .S.  Mill  or  Karl  Marx  were  also  either  moral
philosophers, or,  they linked the problem of economic activity to normative
questions of righteous governance and human nature. Instead of pure, value-
free calculation, economics was conceived as a means to translate social and
political visions into existing reality.
The Methodenstreit erupted with the work of Austrian economist Carl Menger
in the 1860s as he defended economics as a purely theoretical discipline that
deals with general laws and builds upon theorems and logical propositions.
Against  the  Historical  School  of  Schmoller  and  others,  Menger  defended
economics as a descriptive science that approaches its subject on the basis of
“methodological  individualism”:  economics  deals  with  the  value  and
allocation of scarce resources by investigating into the choices of individual
subjects.  It  is value-free in the sense that it  refuses to answer the normative
question on the fair distribution of these resources or the corresponding social
model.14 What it can do, however, is to answer the questions of effectiveness
and  optimality  in  production  and  exchange.  Together  with  so-called
marginalism, the work of Menger and the Austrian School led to the formation
of neoclassical economics, that is, the standard academic discipline we know
today. 
In his early works, Eucken placed himself between the two competing poles
14 With their trust in the market as the most efficient mechanism in the allocation of resources, most
representatives of the Austrian School became de facto defenders of free market capitalism.
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of what he called the “Great Antinomy” between apriorists and historicists.15
Following Menger and the marginalists, he criticized the Historical School for
its lack of systematic approach and defended the a priori character of economic
concepts.  Economics,  Eucken argued,  was to  be  understood as  a  value-free
science that operates with theoretical concepts and goes beyond mere historical
analysis of different societal modes of production such as feudalism, socialism,
and capitalism. Against  the Austrian School,  however,  Eucken defended the
idea  of  economics  as  a  concrete  science  that  has  its  foundation in  the  real
activity of individuals and institutions. Instead of producing mere theoretical
constructions,  economics  should  also  be  able  to  answer  to  normative  and
political questions of a properly functioning economic order, its legal, societal
and institutional dimensions.16
For  Eucken  and  the  ordoliberal  tradition  altogether,  the  concept  of  order
(Ordnung) became the central theoretical concept for the analysis of this web of
relations  that  defines  a  particular  system  of  production.  “As  the  course  of
everyday  economic  life  proceeds  differently  according  to  the  form  of  the
economic  system,”  Eucken wrote,  “the  knowledge  of  the  different  kinds  of
orders is the first step towards understanding of economic reality.”17 Instead of
mere division of labor or relations of power, the concept of order – or economic
order  (Wirtschaftsordnung)  –  referred  to  the  overall  institutional,  legal  and
spiritual aspects of a particular economic system. Encompassing technological
advancements as well as cultural and ethical norms, the concept of order was
thus to be understood as a kind of “economic lifeworld” that is always given to
its subjects in concrete experience. Echoing the Medieval concept of  ordo,  an
economic order is experienced by its subjects as normatively demanding, as
both desirable and “natural”.18 In most cases, the subjects of an economic order
do not view it as an external force but as how things are and how they ought to
be. 
Although  Eucken  spoke  of  various  economic  orders  from  those  of  the
Classical  period in Greece to  Medieval  and contemporary ones,  all  of  them
having their unique ways of arranging production, distribution and exchange,19
the task of scientific observation was to grasp the question of economic order
as  a  «universal  problem»20,  as  a  question  of  the  most  general  features  and
15 EUCKEN 1950,  47ff.  For  a  more  detailed analysis  of  Eucken’s  place  in  economic  history  see  e.g.
GOLDSCHMIDT 2013.
16 EUCKEN 1989, 240.
17 EUCKEN 1989, 58.
18 EUCKEN 1950, 373.
19 EUCKEN 1950, 75.
20 EUCKEN 1950, 30.
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elements. In this regard, economics was to go beyond the variety of individual
orders  and ask,  what  are  the basic  forms on the basis  of  which individual
economies acquire their character? What are the basic morphological or ideal
characteristics of this regional ontology?
Perhaps  the  most  central  element  in  Eucken’s  approach  to  the  question
economic orders was his emphasis on currently adopted “rules of the game”
(Spielregeln).21 To recognize and understand a particular economic order, one
must  ask  what  are  the  basic  norms  and  principles  that  constitute  the
framework  in  which  economic  activity  takes  place.  Ultimately,  economic
systems do not differ from each other on the basis of division of labor, the level
of technological advancement, or who controls the prices, but on the basis of
those  structural  components  and rules  that  define  the  activity  of  economic
subjects.  In  modern  societies,  this  function  is  exercised  primarily  by
constitution that both reflects the general norms of the people and constrains
the powers of both the sovereign as well as individual economic actors. While
private law plays an important role in regulating the relations of individual
subjects (e.g.,  contractual law), it  is the constitutional order that defines the
identity of economic actors and provides them with their respective level of
freedom. It is thus law, and not the choices of individuals, that constitutes the
central element in the analysis of economic order.
Evidently, Eucken’s critical remarks were targeted against both classical and
neoclassical  economists,  who  had  dismissed  the  questions  of  order  and
governance.  With  their  trust  on the  natural  character  of  market  economy –
what Hayek later called the “spontaneous order” – both traditions failed to
appreciate the basic constitutional issues such as regulation and the stability of
price mechanism. While Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” may have worked in
small,  semi-closed  market  economies,  the  production  chains  and  business
cycles of the modern world were infinitely more complex and prone to all sorts
of  disruption.  Thus  the  basic  normative  problem  of  economics  was  to  be
presented in a new way, as a question of the fundamental order: 
The problem will  not  solve itself  simply by our letting economic
systems  grow  up  spontaneously.  The  history  of  the  century  has
shown  this  plainly  enough.  The  economic  system  has  to  be
consciously  shaped.  The  detailed  problems  of  economic  policy,
trade  policy,  credit,  monopoly,  or  tax  policy,  or  of  company  or
bankruptcy law, are part  of  the great  problem of how the whole
economy,  national  and  international,  and  its  rules,  are  to  be
shaped.22
21 EUCKEN 1950, 186 ff.
22 EUCKEN 1950, 314.
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It is not surprising that Michel Foucault, in his  Collège de France lectures on
biopolitics,  took Eucken to be one of the historical originators of “neoliberal
governmentality”,  the  conscious  implementation  of  a  rational  model  of
governance  onto  existing  reality.  For  Foucault,  neoliberalism  was  a  deeply
idealistic  movement  that  was  highly  skeptical  of  “natural”  social  roles  and
traditional practices. As especially the U.S. neoliberalist thought, the logic of
economic relations was to be extended to all areas of human interaction, from
education to penal  justice,  from labor to love.  It  is  in  this  idealistic  pursuit
originated  by  Eucken  and  the  ordoliberal  tradition,  Foucault  argues,  «that
Husserl’s  influence  is  easily  recognizable  –  we  are  dealing  here  with
naturalistic naivety.»23 As Husserl had criticized psychologism and naturalism
for their tendency to reduce all  psychological and spiritual phenomena into
empirical,  natural processes,  Eucken presented the same critique to classical
economics.  Instead  of  merely  deducing  general  principles  from  existing
economies, the domain of economics as science was to be constructed, from
beginning on, as a science of ideal forms that refuses to take any system of
production  as  natural  or  necessary.  Rather,  and  this  in  Foucault’s
understanding,  the  ideal  form  itself  was  to  correct  the  imbalances  and
imperfections  of  a  market  left  on  its  own.  Unlike  classical  liberalism  that
emphasized laissez-faire as the basic principle of economic governance – the
best government is the one that governs the least – the ordoliberals emphasized
the role of state and constitutional order in promoting and securing the best
possible functioning of the market. 
While Eucken’s insistence to construct economics as an eidetic science was
influenced by Husserl, we should not take the ordoliberal theory as a simple
application of phenomenology. What Eucken neglected, in particular, was the
complexity of Husserl’s theory of ideal forms; he took exact, law-like ideality as
the basic paradigm of scientific universality. This move, I argue, not only led to
a  rather  static  view  of  the  economic  domain  but  it  also  had  significant
normative  implications  for  economics  as  a  whole.  However,  in  order  to
understand this relation of influence in more detail, let us take a closer look at
the problem of ideal forms in both Eucken and Husserl.
2. Eucken’s Ideal Forms: Law and Normativity
While  Eucken’s  own theory of  ideal  forms  was  influenced by a  number of
23 FOUCAULT 2008, 172.
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sources,  it  appears  that  Husserl’s  Investigations were  among  the  most
prominent  ones.  In  Eucken’s  early  works  Foundations and  Kapitaltheoretische
Untersuchungen, in particular, most of the references to Husserl deal with his
understanding of ideality and its philosophical-scientific implications.  While
Weber’s theory of “ideal  types” served as an important conceptual point of
reference, Eucken seemed to be impressed by Husserl’s concrete, experience-
focused approach to ideality, and its ability to approach abstract concepts in
parallel to the “development of facts”. This emphasis was linked to Eucken’s
criticism  of  the  Austrian  School  that  shared  the  motives  of  idealism  and
apriorism  but  lacked  an  understanding  of  their  role  in  concrete  economic
relations. «Instead of looking for and finding the order and interrelations in the
seeming chaos of facts», Eucken argued, «they [i.e., other economists] construct
a  chaos  of  concepts  supplementary  to  the  facts.»24 Without  a  firm  link  to
experience, ideal forms tend to lose their concrete character and become mere
tools in of an “architectonic play”. Above all, they become useless in analyzing
historically developing phenomena such as economic orders.
Eucken  himself  employed  the  term  abstraction to  describe  this  search  for
universality  that  both  «starts  from the  individual  fact» and remains  firmly
anchored in it.25 The task of the economist, he argued, is not to look away from
historically developed orders, but to step into the  «path of abstraction» and
work towards the analysis and isolation of their ideal features.26 The problems
of  monopolies  and  credit  bubbles,  for  instance,  appear  only  in  market
economies with developed central institutions and a banking system. They are
not,  however,  problems that  would characterize  merely seventeenth-century
mercantilism  or  contemporary  financial  capitalism.  The  possibility  for  the
emergence of monopolies and cartels defines all such economies that are based
on competition and in which the power of producers is not limited. They are
universal problems that have significance beyond their individual instances. 
Husserl,  likewise,  had  used  the  concepts  of  abstraction  and  ideation  to
describe  the  process  through which the phenomenologist  is  able  to  acquire
knowledge on the ideal features of a particular thing or a domain of being.
Against a sharp distinction between empirical facts and ideal essences, Husserl
was  in  favor  of  a  more  gradual  understanding  of  ideality,  ranging  from
empirical  generalities  to  essential  and  non-essential  types,  from  “bound
idealities” – idealities that cannot be understood without reference to the real
world (e.g., artistic ideas such as Goethe’s Faust) – to “free idealities” that need
24 EUCKEN 1950, 54.
25 EUCKEN 1950, 107ff., 332.
26 EUCKEN 1954, 19.
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no such reference. Neither are all idealities exact as in the case of mathematical
or logical ideas but our experience knows a variety of inexact idealities that
cannot  be  defined  once  and  for  all.  The  idea  of  state,  for  instance,  differs
radically from the objects of Euclidean geometry; it cannot be formalized, but it
can be analyzed by means of eidetic abstraction that aims at discovering its
necessary features (e.g., a state is a limited territoriality intended by a collective
of  subjects).27 Different  “regional  ontologies”,  which  deal  with  the  ideal
foundations of individual sciences, are not given to us in advance. Rather, they
are the products of an active, rigorous analysis of different domains of being.
In his own analysis, Eucken was convinced that all economies can actually be
conceived of as varieties of two basic forms: the “exchange economy” and the
“centrally  directed  economy”.28 These  ideal  forms,  he  argued,  were  to  be
conceived as a sufficient answer to the basic problem of economy as a regional
ontology:  «No  other  types  of  economic  system,  or  even  traces  of  others  –
besides these two – are to be found in economic reality past or present.»29 In
accordance  with  the  concept  of  order,  Eucken  treated  these  forms  as  two
competing answers to the question of basic “rules of the game”. Whereas in
centrally directed economy, the basic choices of production and exchange are
coordinated by a central authority, in exchange economy this power is left to
the economic agents themselves. To be more specific, in exchange economy it is
the market that ultimately resolves the problem of scarcity, and consequently,
directs the allocation of resources. Whether we are dealing with a household, a
small community or a nation state, the basic character of all economic systems
can be defined according to this basic choice on how to allocate resources. 
Both of these forms, however, are in fact defined by a number of sub-forms.30
Centrally directed economies, for one, can either be totally governed by central
authorities such as state institutions, or, they may allow consumers to either
choose or exchange whatever goods are being produced. Exchange economies,
on their part, can be divided into barter and monetary economies and the latter
further  into  simple  (exchange-money)  and  more  complex  (credit-money)
forms.31 Characteristic of these latter forms is the fact that relations of value are
expressed in an objective form, that is, in prices. As in modern economies the
control  of  the  monetary  system  is  often  in  the  hands  of  a  state-controlled
executive  institution  –  in  most  cases,  a  central  bank  –  the  choice  between
centrally  directed economy and exchange economy is  essentially not  one of
27 HUSSERL 1984, § 65.
28 EUCKEN 1950, 117 ff.
29 EUCKEN 1950, 118.
30 EUCKEN 1950, 119 ff.
31 EUCKEN 1950, 129 ff.
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state control vs.  total  absence of state.  Moreover,  individual economies – as
they accrue to different sets of rules – can be characterized according to both
ideal types.32 A single household, for instance, may compete with its goods in
the  market  place,  yet  decide  on  the  division  of  resources  patriarchally;  a
country  may allow free  trade while  being protectionist  in  its  foreign trade.
What is important in determining the order is thus the choice of rules, not the
division of labor or the level of technological advancement.
Although Eucken’s theoretical scope was rather wide, most of his concrete
analyses dealt with the problems of existing centralized economies. One of the
main implications of  this  theoretical  framework was that  it  did not  oppose
socialist  and (war-time) fascist systems with each other, but treated them as
two  variations  of  a  single  ideal  type.  While  Eucken  criticized  classical
economists  for  their  trust  in  the  naturalness  of  market  economies,  he
nevertheless  shared  their  trust  in  the  market  as  the  most  efficient  and
transparent mechanism to resolve the question of scarcity. Especially with the
case of complex production chains such as those of the industrialized world, it
is only a competitive market with a reliable pricing system that can take care of
the efficient allocation of resources. Thus, the single most important task of
central  government  is  to  secure  a  viable  pricing  system  that  consequently
promotes competition among economic actors. In contemporary societies, this
is done most reliably through a politically independent central bank – a topic
that became one the central themes of the whole ordoliberal tradition. 
It is important to note, however, that while Eucken’s thinking was naturally
informed by the German hyperinflation of the early 1920s – and the rather ad
hoc monetary policies of the National Socialists (e.g. the creation of the Office
for Price Formation) – his argument for the neutrality of the central bank was
above all theoretical. Although historical examples have shown the dangers of
a  non-neutral  pricing systems,  the  idea  that  government  ought  to  promote
stable monetary policy via politically neutral  central bank could be derived
naturally from the ideal form of (a complex) exchange economy. The same goes
for his argument against cartels and monopolies. Although there is historical,
empirical data that speaks for the harmfulness of monopolistic positions, the
main reason for their dismantling is theoretical. Cartels ought to be resisted
and fought against by the government because they violate against the basic
principles  of  the  market  by  tampering  the  pricing  mechanism.  What  is
important is that the realm of ideal forms is not one of vague abstractions, but
they are governed by several theoretical principles, consistencies and laws.
Here, I believe, it is important to pay attention to yet another influential point
32 EUCKEN 1950, 232.
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that Eucken acquired from Husserl’s theory of ideal forms: the centrality of the
concept of law. It is indeed remarkable that several of Eucken’s references to
Husserl’s work are in fact related to the law-like character of science and its
search for ideal forms. For instance, in a passage from Investigations that Eucken
explicitly  quotes  in  the  Foundations,  Husserl  speaks  of  science  as  a  «means
towards  the  greatest  possible  conquest  of  the  realm  of  truth  by  our
knowledge»,  a  realm  that  is  «no  disordered  chaos,  but  is  dominated  and
unified by law.»33 What Husserl intended here, first of all, was that the search
for  ideals  must  be  conducted  in  a  systematic  manner,  proceeding  from
elemental principles to higher-level abstractions, from simple forms to complex
ones.  «The  aim»,  he  writes,  «is  not  merely  to  arrive  at  knowledge,  but
knowledge  in  such  degree  and  form  as  would  correspond  to  our  highest
theoretical  aims  as  perfectly  as  possible.» Ultimately,  science  is  a  system,
although always necessarily an incomplete one. But it is only this systematic
character, Eucken concludes, that can do justice to the «interdependence of the
whole  economic  system»,  to  treat  economic  phenomena as  part  of  a  single
whole.34
Interestingly,  in another passage referred to by Eucken, Husserl  makes an
explicit parallel with the highest scientific forms of ideality and the concept of
law.35 “There  is  undeniably  a  subjective,  experiential  distinction  that
corresponds to the fundamental  objective-ideal  distinction between law and
fact”, Husserl writes, and continues: 
If  we  never  had  experienced  the  consciousness  of  rationality,  of
apodeicticity in its characteristic distinction from the consciousness
of facticity, we should not have possessed the concept of law. We
should  not  have  been  able  to  distinguish  generic  (ideal,  law-
determined)  generality  from  universal  (factual,  contingent)
generality, nor necessary (i.e., law-determined, generic) implication
from factual (i.e., contingently universal) implication.36
In  the  classification  of  universality,  those  highest  forms  of  ideality  that
deserve to be called apodictic, that is, completely evident and absolutely certain,
are indeed law-determined. These truths, which Husserl delineates with the
Leibnizian expression vérités de raison, include naturally truths of logic but also
those of other exact sciences that operate with purely ideal concepts, such as
33 EUCKEN 1950, 304.
34 Ibid.
35 EUCKEN 1954, 29.
36 HUSSERL 2001, 90.  See also Eucken’s reference to Husserl’s  Philosophy as Rigorous Science in  EUCKEN
1950, 321.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 4, n. 1 (2016)
124                                                                                                          Timo Miettinen
mathematics and geometry. Of course, other scientific generalizations can take
the form of  law despite  they lack  this  complete  certainty as  in  the  case  of
inductive univeralizations (“All swans are white”) or the laws of mechanics, for
instance. However, it is only pure ideas whose lawfulness is normative in the
pregnant sense. The laws of logic, for instance, are not purely theoretical ideas
but absolutely binding principles  for  rational  thinking altogether.  Logic  not
only describes but prescribes the rules science – and thus, it is to be understood,
ultimately, as a practical discipline. And here, Eucken claims, the insights of his
theory «go hand in hand with the theory of science of significant logicians [i.e.,
Husserl, Lotze, Bolzano].»37
However,  it  is  crucial  to  note  that  Husserl’s  analysis  on  the  practical
applicability of scientific knowledge – or, what he called the “normative turn”
of  theoretical  propositions  –  was  in  fact  much  more  complex  than Eucken
seemed to acknowledge. In his ethical writings, for instance, Husserl came to
oppose  the  classical  Kantian view of  normativity  as  a  strictly  law- or  rule-
oriented type  of  reflection.  Against  the  absolutely  binding  character  of  the
Kantian categorical  imperative (“Act only according to that  maxim whereby
you can at the same time will that it should become a universal law without
contradiction”),  Husserl  emphasized  the  fundamental  relativity  of  ethical
obligations,  and  formulated  his  own  maxim  in  terms  of  striving  at «best
possible at a given moment» (das zur Zeit bestmögliche).38 Instead of universal
laws,  Husserl  spoke  of  two  types  of  “ideals  of  perfection”  –  absolute  and
relative – that fundamentally remind us of the finitude of our capabilities and
the relativity of our carrying situations. While we always ought to act on the
basis of best possible evidence, it is necessary to separate our everyday, relative
ideals  from such absolutely binding principles that  would require complete
certainty  and  self-transparency.  This  concerns  also  our  social  and  political
institutions that are always incomplete formations and ought to be treated as
such.
For  this  reason,  Husserl  actually  argued  that  renewal  (Erneuerung),  both
personal and communal, should be understood as the key theme of ethics.39
Ethical action and moral consideration should not be understood on the basis
of  ideal  laws or  eternal  principles,  but  as  fundamentally  context-dependent
and  relative  to  the  possibilities  and  capabilities  of  the  individual.  The
possibilities  of  an  educated  middle-class  person  with  a  stable  income  are
naturally greater  than those of a  materially or socially deprived individual.
37 EUCKEN 1954, 29.
38 HUSSERL 1988, 36.
39 HUSSERL 1988, 20.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 4, n. 1 (2016)
Governining with Ideas                                                                                                125
And although social  and political  institutions such as education are able to
compensate for some of the inequalities, even they are never perfect. For this
reason, the critical inspection and renewal of our own personal convictions as
well  as  communal  practices  is  the  key  to  understanding  normativity  in
dynamic terms.
What the ordoliberal vision of economics fundamentally neglected was this
de facto inequality that characterizes both the market participants as well as the
actual institutions. This, I argue, resulted from Eucken’s fundamentally grasp
of the market as a game structured by ideal rules and principles. While he did
not consider economics as a purely ideal science in the manner of the Austrian
School,  he  nevertheless  took  law-like  generality  to  be  the  central  model  for  his
understanding of ideality in economics. 
This entailed, first of all, that Eucken understood economics as consisting of
an analysis  of  the  fundamental  laws and regularities  of  different  economic
orders,  in  particular,  their  ideal  forms.  Economics  was  to  be  understood
primarily as an exact science that deals with the institutional side of production
and exchange, the so-called rules of the game. Secondly, on the basis of his
concept of order, Eucken took law (constitutional order) to be also the central
instrument  through which  the  normative  task  of  economics  as  a  science  is
implemented.  For  him,  the  central  problem  of  economics  as  a  normative
discipline resolved into a question of an ideal model best prepared to meet the
demands of a viable price system and free competition. His main concern was
how to protect the legal framework of the state from the influence of different
“pressure groups”, and not how to promote the powers of human action and
democratic deliberation. 
Thus, what began as a project of reclaiming the role of political institutions
for a functioning economy, resulted in a strict separation between economics
and  politics.  The  economy  rests  on  the  fundamental  decision  –  the
constitutional choice – but after this choice has been made, there is no longer
room  for  genuine  politics  within  the  economic  domain.  There  is  only
economics – the optimization and perfection of the ideal “rules of the game”.
As Eucken concludes in the Foundations, the task of the economist is not that of
«discussing doctrines or ideologies but of concrete organization.»40
40 EUCKEN 1950, 315.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 4, n. 1 (2016)
126                                                                                                          Timo Miettinen
Conclusion
As I have argued in this paper, while Walter Eucken’s theoretical framework –
particularly, his understanding of ideality – was deeply influenced by Edmund
Husserl’s  phenomenology,  the normative implications of  his  theory of  ideal
forms  turned  out  to  be  problematic.  While  Eucken  emphasized  the
embeddedness  of  ideality  in  concrete  experience,  he  nevertheless  ended up
positing a specific type of ideality – exact ideality – in his analysis of economic
orders. Economics, like the natural sciences, was to become a fundamentally
value-free study of economic phenomena such as production, distribution and
exchange.  Instead  of  serving  national  interests  or  moral  visions,  it  was  to
construct  a  normative  ideal  of  its  own based on a  fundamentally  apolitical
view of  the  economy.  On the  other  hand,  as  this  interest  developed into  a
question of economic constitution, economics became a  de facto political and
moral program. It presented a vision of society based on a controversial split
between politics and economics, and a highly problematic view on executive
and  legislative  powers.  While  acknowledging  the  scientific  virtue  of
universality,  ordoliberalism produced a  fundamentally  ahistorical  picture  of
production and exchange that seemed to avoid questions of power, class, and
inequality. 
Thus, while Foucault was quite right in accentuating the central influence of
Husserl  for  Eucken’s  theoretical  position,  it  would  be  incorrect  to  consider
ordoliberalism  as  a  simple  application  of  the  phenomenological  method  to
economic  reality.  While  ordoliberalism shared the mistrust  in what Husserl
called “false objectivism” of modern sciences (i.e., naturalism, historicism), it
led to  a  problematic  hypostatization of  law and order  as the  basic  tools  of
economic policy. By doing so, it presented a static vision of normative ideals,
neglecting  the  more  dynamic  aspects  of  Husserl’s  ethics  that  aimed  at  a
comprehensive theory of human renewal.
These ideas and problems are not only of historical relevance. They play a
major role in today’s Europe, especially within the Economic and Monetary
Union  of  the  European  Union.  Unlike  neoliberalism,  which  has  become  a
deeply  polemical  notion  used  mainly  by  its  opponents,  ordoliberalism
continues to thrive also in the language of the official Europe.41 Not only have
we witnessed the strengthening of the ordoliberal, rule-based framework for
economic  policy  within  the  euro  area  but  also  the  growing  power  of
41 As Jürgen Stark, the chief economist of the ECB (2006-2011) put it, Eucken’s Foundations «has been a
constant  source  of  inspiration  throughout  my  career.  Eucken’s  main  insight  was  that  a  market
economy can only flourish in a sustainable manner if certain timeless principles are adhered to.»
STARK 2008.
Metodo. International Studies in Phenomenology and Philosophy
Vol. 4, n. 1 (2016)
Governining with Ideas                                                                                                127
institutions such as the European Commission and the European Central Bank.
There  is  a  deep mistrust  towards  all  European-wide  fiscal  policies  such as
countercyclical  spending  or  the  harmonization  of  taxation.  Even  monetary
policy  should  be  returned  back  to  the  rule-based  framework  as  German
ordoliberal economists have criticized the extraordinary measures (such as QE)
that have been taken up by the ECB in order to tackle deflation. Rules and
market discipline seem like the only way forward.
Democracy, however, is more than a game according to pre-established rules.
It is the capability to take a critical stance towards these rules, to deliberate
them, to transform and renew them. The modern liberal  view according to
which law should limit the powers of the sovereign may be the condition of
liberal democracy; however, we should be aware that this limitation comes with
a price, and that is the disappearance of the “people” as a constitutive principle
of  politics.  In  today’s  Europe,  we are  only  able  to  decide  nationally  which
instruments of  austerity are we to implement;  the key decisions concerning
monetary  policy  or  European-wide  fiscal  policies  are  left  to  the  “experts”.
Thus, the key “democracy deficit” of the EU – today - concerns not only the
lack  of  a  European  demos,  but  more  importantly,  the  changed  institutional
structure of the economic governance.
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